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ABSTRACT
The decreasing tension between the United States and the Soviet Union
obscures a harsh reality. In a world where the probability of a nuclear exchange
between the two superpowers is at its lowest point since the early 1950s,
American nuclear weapons are more vulnerable than ever to "low intensity"
threats. Some terrorist organizations have become sophisticated enough to
actually steal or destroy a warhead, while the Special Purpose Forces of the Soviet
Union retain the capability to curtail the reliability of American strategic systems
from within the United States or Europe. These two very real threats are derived
from the same factors - the openness of American society, and the enormous
difficulty of providing security for these weapons. Because it is difficult to
separate terrorism issues, the analysis of possible outcomes goes beyond the
weapons themselves to include nuclear materials and power plants.
This paper will examine nuclear terrorism within the context of what the US
government has come to call "Low Intensity Conflict", or LIC. The SPETZNAZ
threat is considered even though political developments in Europe indicate that the
likelihood of such attacks is decreasing. Indeed, the Soviet Union could be part
of the solution rather than the threat. This may result from a renunciation of
terrorist support, and from the recognition that US-Soviet joint efforts could be
the best insurance against nuclear terrorism which threatens both superpowers -
especially as the Soviet Empire unravels.
International terrorists are alive and well. Whether acting alone or for the
benefit of a foreign government, they are beginning to penetrate American
society as never before. Until recently, the terrorist threat to US assets and
citizens was more or less confined to incidents outside the country. As terrorist
organizations become increasingly frustrated with their operations overseas, the
incentive to operate within US borders increases. Another factor is the tendency
for terrorists to undertake more and more shocking violent actions in order to
maintain the public's attention (mid-air bombings have certainly achieved this
goal for now). This paper will attempt to explain the nature of the threat and
recommend possible preventive or remedial actions government can take.

PART I
TERRORISM AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
There are two fundamental forms of political violence - war and
"Low Intensity Conflict", or LIC. War has punctuated the entire
historical process and is relatively well understood. Low intensity
conflict is a contemporary phenomenon that permeates modern society
but is little understood. Because low intensity conflict is rapidly
supplanting war as a path to conflict resolution, the field of National
Security Affairs is transforming itself from the study of war to the study
of LIC. War and LIC are qualitatively different, presenting governments
with different sets of choices and requiring different actions. In order to
discuss terrorism, we must first discuss LIC, for LIC is the context within
which terrorism takes place. (1)
Low intensity conflict is an ambiguous term that means different
things to different people. The Department of Defense has defined LIC
as follows:
"Political-military confrontation between contending
states or groups below conventional war and above
the routine, peaceful competition among states. It
frequently involves protracted struggles of compet-
ing principles and ideologies. Low Intensity Conflict
ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It
is waged by a combination of means, employing polit-
ical, economic, informational, and military instruments.
Low Intensity Conflicts are often localized, generally
in the Third World, but contain regional and global se-
curity implications. "(2)
Since LIC contains the word "conflict", a common misconception has
been that it is therefore DoD's problem to solve (indeed, the remaining
branches of government do not even define the term). This is an
outgrowth of long US Government experience as well as the inadequacy
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of the term itself. The military has always been called upon to "take care
of political situations not lending themselves to diplomatic or economic
solutions. The American experience from the end of World War II
through the invasion of Panama has prompted many, both military and
civilian, to question the wisdom of that approach.
The term Low Intensity Conflict raises questions, however. The
first is, "Low intensity relative to what?" The second is, "What is
conflict?" The third is, "How is LIC different from what we think of as
war - and peace?" In other words, in order to use the term, we must
explain why it is needed. We must prove that LIC is not simply a new
military "buzzword" and why it requires government officials to use an
entirely different decision-making process.
In response to the first question, we can say that LIC is low intensity
relative to conventional or nuclear war. A LIC event will not trigger the
massive and unanimous government response that war always does. It
will not involve sustained combat for conventional military forces, and it
does not usually drain the treasury. Low Intensity Conflict military
responses are constrained, both in terms of scope and time. The military
instrument is used only some of the time, and even then in a measured
way.
The answer to the second question is that the "conflict" in LIC is
political conflict rather than military. Even in cases where military
forces are to play a part of the solution, the conflict is political. In
resolving a LIC situation, the military dimension of the solution can only
be effective after the political conflict is resolved. That is why LIC is
often referred to as politico-military conflict, whereas war is sometimes
called armed conflict.
To answer the third question, LIC is neither peace nor war but
somewhere inbetween. It is, at the same time, peace without stability and
war without victory. Within the LIC environment, it is in government's
power to control the character of the conflict. Events can be brought to
resolution (or peace as we generally understand it) through the patient
application of a cohesive government strategy. On the other hand, if LIC
events are mismanaged, they can lead to war. This is what happened in
Vietnam.
In order to understand LIC completely, it is necessary to understand
the concept of legitimacy. In war, the disputants fight for terrain; in
LIC, they fight for legitimacy. There is only so much of it to go around.
As in a tug-of-war, what one side loses the other side gains. Nations
combatting terrorism often resort to brutal tactics which increase the
legitimacy of the terrorists relative to the government. This is what
happened to the French in Algeria - revelations of government torture
helped the terrorists re-define themselves as freedom fighters. The
government finally withdrew. The real challenge is not to defeat
terrorism but to defeat it without forfeiting legitimacy.
The remaining key consideration when thinking about LIC is the
concept of perspective. Low Intensity Conflict for the US Government is
usually war for another government. For the United States, civil war in
Nicaragua is LIC. This does not mean that the conflict itself is less
intense but only that American involvement in it is less intense. Even the
"war" on terrorism is not a war. The worst terrorist events remain in the
LIC regime because the combatants are hidden among the people and do
not threaten national survival. Counter-terrorism efforts are defined by
the constraints of LIC management, and in an open society such as the
United States, these constraints are significant.
This takes us back to the hypothesis that there are just two paths to
conflict resolution - war and LIC. In response to world events that
disturb peaceful relationships, the US Government must use one path or
the other. If we choose the path of war, the Pentagon is well-prepared to
carry out a national military strategy crafted to attain the political
objective sought (normally national survival). If we choose the path of
LIC, the whole government must become involved in a constellation of
activities - some military, but most not. The national survival is not
threatened directly, and there is always a debate within the government
regarding which actions may or may not be appropriate. Military forces
are just one of the four basic tools the President can utilize in resolving
LIC situations. The other three are political, economic, and
informational - and they normally need to be applied before armed forces
are engaged.
The large number of government actors that must interact to solve
LIC problems complicates the process enormously. There are no set
rules, formulas, or plans for LIC situations. Each one is unique, and each
one requires a tailored mix of the four government instruments. The
absence of a permanent executive agent for all LIC management places a
tremendous burden on the only supra-departmental organization available
- the National Security Council. The NSC is the only body that can pull
together all the resources the government needs, but it is not structured
for managing all the LIC tools in an orchestrated effort. The MacFarlane
NSC got into trouble because it tried to be something it wasn't designed to
manage. The NSC staff is a policy guidance factory, not a management
organization. But there is a management vacuum that must be filled each
time a LIC event emerges - and NSC is the only staff available to fill it.
There are four basic types of LIC events that the US Government
must respond to - terrorism, insurgency, regional conflict, and
international narcotics trafficking. The variations on these four themes
are practically endless, but together they define the environment we call
LIC. The American response to the Achille Lauro hijacking was
markedly different than was its handling of the Dozier kidnapping. Both
were incidents of international terrorism, however each required a
completely unique approach. Similarly, the Marxist insurgency in El
Salvador has been treated very much differently than the Marxist
insurgency in the Philippines. In both cases the US maintains strong (if
not vital) national interests, but differences in geography, politics,
insurgent tactics, and host government attitudes have dictated dissimilar
US Government strategies. The US was brought to the very fringe of the
Iran-Iraq war because of political competition with Moscow as well as the
strategic importance of Persian Gulf oil. There was no similar response,
however, in the case of the recently-resolved Vietnamese occupation of
Cambodia (neither is the US taking an active role in the lingering
insurgency there). Many of the same types of factors have dictated
different US Government approaches to reducing the supply of cocaine
from several South American countries.
Terrorism is the LIC event that demonstrates the severity of the
government's management problem most effectively. Since the
requirement for action in terrorist situations is compressed into days or
hours, there is very little time to formulate the unique strategies required
for each particular situation. The White House (through the NSC crisis
staff) immediately takes control and must maintain it thoughout the
incident. The Defense Department, State Department, CIA, and others
are called upon to provide information and proposed courses of action to
individuals not trained or organized to evaluate them. If the wrong mix
of government instruments is decided upon, Americans may die,
international relationships may crumble, and US prestige may suffer. All
we know about the next terrorist incident is that it will occur. We don't
know when it will happen - nor do we know which type of terrorism it
will be.
PART II
THE CASE FOR NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Nuclear weapons have kept the world safe from nuclear war for
more than forty years. The current trend towards reduced stockpiles of
nuclear weapons among the superpowers is matched, however, by several
trends which threaten to interrupt the balance of terror we call
deterrence. Some terrorist organizations have become sophisticated
enough to actually steal or manufacture nuclear weapons. As if this were
not frightening enough, some nations now support those terrorists in their
struggle against Western values and ideas. The combination of terrorist
and state sponsor has elevated the threat of nuclear terrorism to
dangerous proportions. (3)
There are two fundamental schools of thought relative to nuclear
terror. One school says that it is not likely because theft or manufacture
of a weapon is too difficult. Proponents of this school also cite the
relative ease with which terrorists could employ chemical and biological
agents to inflict mass casualties. The other school of thought recognizes
nuclear terror to be inevitable. For proponents of this school, state
sponsorship has placed certain terrorist organizations on the brink of
armageddon. Both schools are based in data and logic, leaving decision-
makers to sort out the realities of budgeting and planning.
One of the problems decision-makers face right away is that there is
no universally accepted definition of terrorism. Definitions are only
important because they summarize agreements and understandings, but
they are important. There are no agreements or understandings relative
to nuclear terror. It would difficult to argue, for instance, that the
doctrine of "Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)" is not a form of
terrorism. Indeed, that is precisely the argument that some terrorist
organizations and their state sponsors have begun to voice. Brian Jenkins
has observed that terrorists imitate governments. The possession of
nuclear weapons by major nations makes those weapons somehow
"legitimate". (4) Deterrence of nuclear war has worked well for the
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superpowers, but it may now be responsible for increasing the probability
of nuclear terrorism. Whether they call themselves freedom fighters or
defenders of the faith, some terrorist organizations are now capable of
destroying cities, and the major nations have given them the philosophical
green light. (5)
The identification problem reaches extreme proportions when states
themselves resort to terrorist tactics during periods of general peace.
Victor Suvurov describes the Special Purpose Forces (SPETZNAZ) of
the Soviet GRU as having the responsibility for conducting terrorist acts
against Western adversaries. (6) There are two basic SPETZNAZ
missions - to destroy the enemy's system of government, and to destroy
his nuclear capability. To be successful, these operations have to be
undertaken before the initiation of overt hostilities (in other words,
within the LIC environment). In this sense, the protection of nuclear
weapons and systems against terrorism must include protection against
SPETZNAZ.
Nuclear Violence Options . Terrorists have five options for inflicting
nuclear devastation. They can explode a nuclear fission bomb, make a
dispersal device, poison large numbers of people with radioactivity,
attack nuclear power plants, or they can attack nuclear weapons facilities.
Figure 2-1 plots these options against the five principal types of terrorist
groups according to motivation. The product of each matchup is a
relative probability of occurrence. The numbers are judgments, based
upon general capabilities, history, and motivation. They indicate possible
resource investment priorities. They also give us a place to start in
assessing the problem.
Hezbollah, for example, might be perfectly willing to use a fission
bomb but does not have the infrastructure to support construction - or the
geographic position to steal a weapon. The Abu Nidal Organization, on
the other hand, supported by Libya, has the mobility and the funding to
acquire a bomb. Nihilist organizations such as the German Red Army
Faction are a threat to Americans in Europe but have little incentive to
initiate a nuclear device (although they might very well instigate a
political crisis through sabotage of nuclear facilities). Ideological
terrorists, epitomized by the New People's Army of the Philipines, will
target US facilities without regard to their purpose. Criminal terrorism,
recently introduced by the cocaine cartels of Colombia, has not yet
migrated to the United States. Displaced Palestinians still represent the
greatest threat.
There are just two ways to get nuclear explosives; they must be
stolen or constructed. Radiological weapons are relatively easy to make,
and if nuclear material can be stolen, such weapons could be the principal
threat to society. Nuclear reactor sabotage cannot be discounted,
particularly in the wake of the disaster at Chernobyl. Terrorists
terrorize, and Chernobyl terrorized everyone who lives in nations with
nuclear power plants. The threat of terrorist or SPETZNAZ attacks
against nuclear weapons storage sites and systems, though difficult, must
be ranked as on of the most serious possible outcomes.
Theft of a Nuclear Weapon . The superpowers have expended
considerable effort over the last forty years to ensure that access to
nuclear weapons is reserved for only those personnel directly involved
with their manufacture, storage, and employment. While that amounts to
a large number of personnel, the security systems that have evolved are
essentially sound. This does not mean terrorists cannot steal a weapon,
however, and total security is elusive.
This is particularly true in the transportation phase of the stockpile-
to-target sequence. As weapons are taken from storage and either flown
or driven to the launch site, they immediately become more vulnerable to
theft. Smaller weapons are the most vulnerable. Public disclosure of
"backpack nukes" stockpiled in Germany was especially troublesome in
the early 80s. These weapons are literally portable and would be the
weapon of choice for terrorists worldwide. The number of terrorist
organizations capable of stealing a weapon on the road is far greater than
the number of groups potentially capable of constructing one. Theft of
even a heavily-guarded nuclear weapon in transit would require tactics
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and equipment already well-known to most terrorists and could
presumably accomplished without state support.
The Department of Energy and the Department of Defense conduct
regular (although not very frequent) exercises to ensure the security of
nuclear weapons in transit. The fact that a weapon has never been stolen,
however, does constitute the only measure of their effectiveness. It is not
the large number of US nuclear weapons but rather their dispersal that
creates the biggest security risk. On a systems level, warheads are kept
in a central facility under heavy security while the rest of the system is
kept available to military units for training and maintenance. By
minimizing the number of storage sites, planners can improve the
security posture for stored weapons.
On a higher level, worldwide dispersal of nuclear weapons is a key
component of nuclear strategy and foreign policy. The US policy of
Soviet containment has driven successive administrations to deploy
nuclear weapons outside the boundaries of the United States. These
weapons include portable Atomic Demolition Munitions as well as bombs,
artillery shells and missiles. The "forward defense" of the United States
has long been touted by those administrations as essential for the
protection of vital US security interests. Although it would certainly be
better for us to fight a future war overseas, the preparation for such a
war has led us to disperse our nuclear weapons dangerously far afield.
Construction of a Nuclear Weapon . There is no longer anything
mysterious about the construction of a crude nuclear device. As several
college students have shown us, the design for a rudimentary fission
bomb is simple enough to be undertaken by a reasonably well-trained
mind. Admiral Thomas Davies tells the story of a physicist who, inspired
by a junk dealer's add for surplus US Army "Honest John" warheads
(disarmed and without fissionable material), commissioned an electical
engineering student to design a nuclear weapon that could be built in a
garage. A crude bomb design, said to be potentially functional, was
produced in about forty hours. (7) Under present plans, the amount of
separated Plutonium derived from commercial power reactors overseas
will exceed 400 metric tons by the year 2000. Only about 15 pounds are
needed to construct a fission bomb. (8)
We must conclude, then, that terrorists are capable of designing and
building nuclear weapons. The bomb would not necessarily be efficient
or powerful, but the only measure of effectiveness needed would be
whether or not it could be detonated. If a certain group needs the experts
to actually do it, we must assume they will find them. There is no other
basis upon which to plan the government's possible courses of action.
There is no point in debating the possibility - it exists. The probability
may be quite low, but the probability of ail terrorism is quite low (the
chances of any individual becoming the victim of of a terrorist attack are
on the same order of magnitude as being hit by lightning). With a
nuclear event, however, probability is meaningless. Beyond the physical
devastation would be widespread panic and the psychological impact of
government powerless to protect its citizens.
Construction of Radiological Weapons . It is much easier to build a
radiation dispersal device. Assuming that terrorists can obtain Highly-
enriched Uranium or Plutonium, the basic design is not much different
from a nail bomb. Any device that will throw radioactive material far
enough to contaminate a densly populated area would cause very serious
near-term and long-term damage to everyone who managed to survive
the blast. As far as we know, there are an estimated 9,600 pounds of
Highly-enriched Uranium and Plutonium unaccounted for in the United
States alone. (9) Terrorist bombs, made with abundant plastic explosives,
are detonated somewhere in the world almost every day.
Of course, the psychological impact of a dispersal device would not
approach that of an actual nuclear detonation. Moreover, if terrorists
wanted to save some effort, they could terrorize whole cities by
threatening to dump their radioactive material into water sources in the
mountains. The possibility of a radiological weapon, however, cannot be
ruled out by government planners. Additionally, government measures
aimed at preventing terrorists from constructing dispersal devices are the
same as those for preventing the construction of explosive devices - deny
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terrorists the opportunity to steal fissionable material. Even though
enormous quantities of material remain unaccounted for, the US
Government must assume that strict accountability from here on will
reduce the likelihood for development of both types of terrorist tools.
Nuclear Reactor Sabotage . The prospect of terrorists penetrating a
nuclear power plant is easy to imagine. Even though most plants are now
protected to a greater degree than ever before, they are still more
vulnerable to attack than nuclear weapons facitlities protected by the
Defense Department. One of the reasons for this is that they are easier to
get to. Another is that the attractiveness of these plants to terrorists is a
matter of debate. In response to postulated scenarios involving truck
bombs detonated near nuclear power plants, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has been studying whether or not additional hardening is
necessary. The NRC has always maintained that its security measures
assume that the United States will continue to have general civil order.
Ostensibly, if that order were to break down, military forces would be
dispatched. This is not the answer, however, because the same
breakdown of order would likely exceed the capacity of US-based
military forces to execute military functions.
The sabotage option cannot be discounted, though, especially after
Chernobyl. Of the potential targets we are discussing, nuclear power
plants are the most vulnerable. They are also, thankfully, the least
attractive to terrorists. US plants are not Plutonium-based and do not
produce Plutonium. Additionally, licensed research reactors have been
modified to use low-enriched Uranium. The NRC is probably correct in
placing more of its concern on safe operation and less on trying to fortify
its plants DoD-style. Transportation of the Highly-enriched Uranium still
utilized is NRC's biggest problem.
Attack on Nuclear Weapons Facilities . American nuclear weapons
plants and storage facilities can be attacked by well-trained, extremely
motivated terrorists. It is doubtful, however, that even the most highly
trained and motivated can get away with a weapon (although the attack
itself could have significant impact on US policy). The locations of
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European storage sites are well known, and nihilist organizations based in
those countries have demonstrated enough distaste for the American
presence to attempt such attacks. The only way to prevent these relatively
low-risk, high-payoff terrorist operations would be to remove US nuclear
weapons from European soil altogether.
State Sponsorship . The spectre of nations assisting, encouraging, and
even recruiting terrorists as proxy forces has elevated the threat of
nuclear terrorism from fiction to expectation. With the money,
diplomatic protection, and engineering support of such nations as Iran
and Libya, terrorists must now be considered capable exercising any of
the above options. State sponsors implement their own violent agendas
through terrorists. For the planner, state sponsorship complicates the
prevention/response equation even further. Nuclear terrorism has
become a foreign policy problem as well.
State sponsorship entails more than simply paying a terrorist
organization to carry out attacks against other nations and individuals.
Libya's Khaddafy has long supported Palestinian (and many other)
terrorist groups in their attacks against American targets in Germany. A
short while after he was punished with an American air raid, certain West
German companies were caught supporting Libya's efforts to develop a
chemical weapons plant. The German government hesitated at first to
investigate the allegations and only later admitted that its industries had
provided the materials and expertise. This is state support, if not state
sponsorship.
In the same way, those nations which do not adhere to the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty of 1970 enhance the opportunity for nuclear
terrorism. Israel is widely believed to have developed nuclear weapons
(possibly as many as 200) but has not signed the treaty. Neither have
Argentina, Brazil (reaffirmed in April 1990), Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and
South Africa. The international non-proliferation regime is helpful but
not particularly effective. Just as locks are for honest people, the NPT is
for nations predisposed to safeguard against proliferation. The Middle
East is experiencing a nuclear arms race that threatens all nations.
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The Role of Superpowers . The superpowers bear major
responsibility for the so-called "vertical proliferation" of nuclear weapons.
It is only within the last year (Gorbachev's 5th year) that serious nuclear
arms reduction appears possible. The example this trend sets for the rest
of the world cannot be overstated. It could mark the beginning of the end
for nuclear war as a foreign policy option. The final act will have to be to
reign in the new members of the nuclear club and prevent all nations from
contributing to nuclear proliferation and terrorism. This must entail
imposing superpower will upon nations that choose to develop weapons as
well as those which continue to separate Plutonium in their reactors.
The key to international control will be US-Soviet cooperation on a
series of agreements regarding how to treat nations which violate the
rules. The April 1986 bombing of Libya (and the resulting decrease in
Khaddafy-sponsored terrorism) should serve as a precedent for
superpower control of Third World terrorist options. The credibility of
conventional retaliation for terrorist nuclear violence would be enhanced
through the formal conclusion of an agreement. Preemption of Third
World nations that prepare to use nuclear weapons against each other
should be the next step after that. Terrorists and their sponsors will need
the spectre of superpower solidarity. The world needs more than a




The differences between LIC and war are generally simple to
explain. War involves sustained combat between the armed forces of
nation-states. It is fought for clear, military objectives, normally without
constraints, against a commonly recognized threat. LIC, on the other
hand, involves irregular struggles with sub-national entities. When
military forces are utilized, it is for political objectives and in
combination with non-military measures against a non-consensus threat.
Terrorism and government measures to combat terrorism lie on the very
seam between LIC and war. Decision-makers must decide how to fight a
"war" that, inconveniently, resides in an environment of Low Intensity
Conflict. (10)
When military forces are called upon to strike directly against
terrorist targets, political obstacles intrude immediately. The rescue of
Americans held hostage, for instance, collides with legal constraints inside
the United States and diplomatic constraints overseas. The Posse
Comitatus Act proscribes military forces from conducting law
enforcement operations on American soil. This has required the FBI to
develop a parallel military hostage rescue capability. The US Navy's
capture of Palestinian terrorists over the Mediterranean in October of
1985 demonstrated that a military success in LIC can be a political
failure.
Given these constraints, the defense department's very capable
"Counterterrorist Joint Task Force" has never been used for direct strikes
against terrorists in the ten years since it was formed. Because of these
difficulties, the task force has gradually evolved to become the president's
general purpose "rapid deployment force", seeing action in Grenada and
Panama. Counterterrorist forces, having little real utility other than
deterrence, are looking for work. The political difficulty of attacking
terrorists militarily could not be demonstrated more clearly.
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Indirect actions, both military and non-military, have been the rule
in the field of countering terrorism. The State Department has lead
agency responsibility for countering terrorism overseas, and virtually all
of its energy is channelled into international agreements and bilateral
training programs. US military counterterrorist forces do participate in
the fight against international terrorism, but they do it behind the scenes
as trainers and advisors. At home, these elite units cannot be utilized to
prevent or respond to criminal activity. And that is precisely what
terrorism is - criminal behavior cloaked in political sloganeering. The
problem is that terrorist crimes, whether they be domestic or
international, can now threaten the lives of millions of people.
The Department of Defense spends most of its time and money
deterring and preparing for general war with the Soviet Union.
Although it is going on all the time, Low Intensity Conflict receives far
less attention. The rule is this: Leaders must be prepared to deal with the
most important possible outcomes before they tackle the most likely .
This does not, however, remove from them the responsibility for
conducting military operations in the LIC environment. The difficulty of
using military tools in LIC was demonstrated most recently in Panama,
where the economic sanctions applied in early 1988 did more damage
than the invasion finally launched almost two years later. For all forms
of terrorism where low numbers of individuals are victimized, relatively
meager defense resources can be committed. Nuclear terrorism,
however, must be grouped with the most important possible outcomes to
plan for. Like general war, it is not likely; but it cannot be allowed to
happen.
Deterring Nuclear Terrorism in a LIC Environment . Louis Rene
Beres, citing Kafka, characterizes the government's dilemma as a choice
between the doctor and the locksmith. (11) In other words, in order to
deter terrorists from going nuclear, we can try to convince them that
nuclear targets are counterproductive - or we can harden all the possible
targets. Actually, there is no reason to have to choose. We must call
upon the doctor and the locksmith to work together.
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The Doctor . Behavior modification has not been particularly
successful in the general case, but recent events offer some optimism. In
the late 1980s, mainstream PLO terrorists became convinced that violence
outside the occupied territories provides a disincentive for other nations
to pressure Israel to trade land for peace. Although radical factions of
the organization continue to strike international targets, the Arafat
following has refrained. In January of1 990, Colombian president
Virgilio Barco was able to convince the M-19 terrorist organization to
lay down its weapons and become a legitimate political party. Even the
April murder of its leader, presidential candidate Carlos Pizarro, has not
galvanized M-19 to return to the jungle. In both cases terrorists with a
history of extreme violence decided that certain forms of behavior will
not get them what they want. Diplomatic action can have positive impact
and should be part of an integrated approach to deterring nuclear
terrorism.
One of the problems with behavioral strategies is that all terrorists
are not created equal. As discussed in Part II, each type of motivation
produces a fundamentally different genre of terrorist. In an academic
context, mischaracterization is relatively harmless. In the managment of
a nuclear incident, however, mischaracterization could lead to the
application of inappropriate government tools - and disaster. What we
write and say can have a significant impact on what terrorists attempt to
do. Treating religious zealots the same as nihilists is a prescription for
disaster (without the prospect of martyrhood, Red Army Faction
terrorists are much more likely to respond to armed threats than
Hezbollah).
The doctor's prescription must include some rules for the media. In
a very objective piece on the subject, Sander Vanocur makes the point
that, although the jounalist has a job to do, the Constitution says nothing
about "the people's right to know". (12) As government officials frame a
strategy of behavioral deterrence, the media must be made aware that
they are often a tool of the terrorist. Mere recognition is insufficient,
however; the major networks must pledge not to compete for terrorist
business. Reporters must become part of the solution rather than part of
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the problem. In this effort, consideration should be given to managing a
media "pool" during terrorist incidents and providing a single
government point-of-contact from which reporters can glean
information. This might sound draconian to a journalist, but it has
worked for the defense department in other Low Intensity Conflict events
(most recently Panama).
Brian Jenkins has observed that most terrorists come from the
departments of social sciences and humanities. (13) This may help
explain why the technically demanding project of nuclear fission has not
been undertaken successfully. It may also provide government planners
with some hope of convincing certain terrorists that nuclear violence is
counterproductive. Fortunately, the most destructive-minded terrorists
are usually the least educated. The same general rule seems to apply to
criminals. One goal should be to keep educated terrorists engaged in the
"white-collar" manifestations of political dissent. European nihilist
organizations, ironically, could be the easiest to deal with non-violently.
Ideological and nationalistic organizations usually lack the education and
technical sophistication; but with their proclivity for state support, they
are especially dangerous. This is why it is imperative that governments
follow a dual-track strategy .
The Locksmith
. The typology introduced in Part II is a good place
to begin discussing measures to harden nuclear targets. The first step, of
course, is to identify precisely what it is we are trying to prevent. In
descending order of criticality, these events are:
-Theft or fabrication of a nuclear explosive device.
-Radiological poisoning of large numbers of people.
-Manufacture of a radiological dispersal device.
-Attack on a nuclear weapons facility.
-Attack on a nuclear power plant.
If we distill this array into a pure physical security context, the following
protection tasks emerge:
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-Prevent theft of nuclear weapons.
-Prevent theft of fissile material (Highly Enriched Uranium
or Plutonium).
-Prevent attacks on nuclear power plants.
The record shows that between 1970 and 1985 there were 12 events
that could legitimately be included under these groupings. (14) Of the
12, seven were actions against nuclear power plants (mostly in the Basque
region of Spain). There were four attempts by state supporters of
terrorists to steal or manufacture nuclear explosives - one by Idi Amin,
and three by Muammar Khaddafy (who apparantly has a standing cash
offer for the delivery of a nuclear device to be used against the West).
The sole incident involving a weapons facility was a 1985 demonstration
explosion followed by a threat to attack the Woensdrecht airbase where
the Dutch government had authorized placement of US Ground Launched
Cruise Missiles. Only one of the incidents occurred in the United States
(the 1976 bombing of a power company headquarters in Maine), and even
that event was not a direct attack on the power plant itself. There were
41 other "nuclear-related" incidents, all symbolic attacks or threats far
removed from nuclear targets.
What this small data base suggests is that nuclear violence is not
something even the most hardened terrorist organizations readily turn to.
Terrorists, particularly the ideologically driven, understand the concept
of legitimacy. Like any political organization, they attempt to develop
and nurture a constituency. They are, in this sense, at the mercy of the
public minset. Though massive violence is not always helpful for all
terrorists, the problem for planners is that they must assume worst case.
In the domain of counter-nuclear terrorism, there is no room for error.
Preventing Theft of Nuclear Weapons . Fortunately, stealing a
nuclear weapon is difficult. It is difficult because there is consensus and
money to provide multi-layered, electronically sophisticated defenses
around storage sites and operating systems. This does not mean,
however, that penetration of nuclear weapons facilities is impossible.
There are many terrorist organizations capable of at least getting to a
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weapon. In the case of nuclear weapons, that may be enough to impact on
the US Government and its interests significantly. The siezure or
damaging of a weapon in Europe, for instance, could precipitate the
withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from one or more nations. This could
happen even if the terrorists had no chance to actually detonate the
weapon.
Detonating a stolen nuclear weapon poses additional problems.
Permissive Action Links (PALs) are built into most weapons.
"Command-disable" and "One-point Safe" features further protect against
unauthorized detonation. These measures, if applied consistently, would
stop all but the most determined terrorists - but they are not yet
universal. The US Navy has long cited the complex shipboard launch
sequence as rationale for not using PALs on its seaborne weapons. The
process, which can involve up to 30 individuals, appears to insure against
unauthorized release but would not be a factor if seaborne weapons were
hijacked. One of the keys to preventing attempts to steal nuclear weapons
would be to convince terrorists that all US nuclear weapons are useless to
them. For that effort to be credible, the Navy would have to adopt the
same physical security standards as the rest of the Defense Department.
Perhaps the greatest threat resides in the Third World. As more and
more nations develop nuclear weapons, it becomes increasingly difficult
for the United States to ensure that its citizens are not vulnerable to
nuclear violence. New members of the nuclear club (Israel and possibly
South Africa) do not even acknowledge the existence of their weapons. It
is virtually impossible for the US to influence their security regimes until
they come out of the closet. As new weapons are developed, they will be
more vulnerable than US weapons. They might be stored with less
physical security, and they will certainly not have PALs. Planners
looking for worst-case scenarios need look no farther than the Middle
East where the race for the Islamic bomb continues. State sponsorship,
characteristic of that region, may soon combine with nuclear technology
to free the terrorist from having to steal anything.
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Preventing an attack on a nuclear weapons facility can be grouped
together with the prevention of theft. If security systems are designed to
deter penetration of the facility, they will also serve to insulate that
facility against sabotage. Protecting nuclear weapons involves more than
simply sound physical security. Denial of access is the key to preventing
attack, whether by means of a traditional, military-style raid or through
an inside job. Personnel reliability screening is just as important as layers
of fences and sentries.
As the number of facilities increases, however, the degree to which
they can be protected decreases. Resources, even for the prevention of
nuclear sabotage, are limited. In some scenarios, the spreading of storage
facilities can be desireable. Particularly in Europe, the distance between
the stockpile and the launch system dictates the speed with which a
nuclear response can be delivered. More storage sites, farther forward,
means less security on each site but reduced requirements for
transportation of warheads. In Europe the trend has been towards
centralized storage. This probably helps protect against the average
terrorist but increases America's strategic vulnerability to SPETZNAZ
targeting just prior to war.
Certainly the United States must continue to invest significant
amounts of resources (both manpower and money) in the protection of
nuclear weapons. Facilities, transportation systems, and operating
systems must be secured beyond any stretch of the prolific terrorist
imagination aimed at their siezure. The theft of a weapon must be so
difficult that terrorists dedicated to initiating nuclear violence will have to
pursue the much-more-difficult option of constructing a weapon.
Preventing Theft of Fissile Material . There are literally thousands
of tons of Enriched Uranium and Plutonium in the world. It is virtually
impossible for the United States to prevent terrorists from obtaining
enough material to construct a nuclear weapon (15 pounds of Plutonium).
Terrorists bent on radiological poisoning or dispersal of radiation with
conventional explosives could do it with even less material. The United
States has taken significant preventive measures by reducing the use of
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Highly Enriched Uranium in research reactors and abandoning the use of
Plutonium in nuclear power plants. The "Fast Breeder" concept, wherein
weapons-grade Plutonium is actually produced by the reactor, has also
been abandoned.
The problem we do not seem to be able to solve is, again, overseas.
Other Western nations (and Japan) continue to use Plutonium and breeder
reactors. Despite assurances that all separated Plutonium is under strict
accountability, the terrorist has a steady source if he wants it. The "Fort
Knox" strategy for storing separated Plutonium in the US would not
protect our citizens to any greater degree. It would appear that the only
way to contain the problem (since we can't put the genie back in the
reprocessing plant) is to convince the general public that terrorists have
no incentive to use the materials for mass destruction. Regrettably, the
argument would have to be that car-bombs are already effective enough,
and poisoning the water supply of a major city can be accomplished more
easily with LSD.
Preventing Attacks on Nuclear Power Plants . There are
approximately 370 nuclear power plants in twenty-seven countries, with
more on the way. Concern over global warming has driven even some
hard-core anti-nuclear activists to the realization that nuclear generation
of electricity is less damaging to the environment than conventional
means. Although the operating reactors in the US are quite vulnerable to
terrorist attack, the amount of nuclear violence that could be produced is
a matter of debate. Whether or not a "van-bomb" exploded in the
visitors' parking lot of a well-advertised nuclear power plant could cause
the release of radioactive material, there remains a perception that such
an event could take place. (15)
And that is enough. As with so many other manifestations of
terrorism, the perception of what can be done is more important than the
reality. This is the essence of terrorism - to instill fear in the people so
that government will be either forced to change fundamentally or quit
altogether. If the general public can be convinced that power reactors are
invulnerable to stand-off rocket attacks and the direct application of
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demolitions, then terrorists will acquire a disincentive to plan such
operations. (16) Removing fear is not only more effective than layers of
additional security (which is already substantial), it is much less costly.
As members of the general public, terrorists can be persuaded that there
is no profit in attacking these facilities; however, as long as they believe
that nuclear reactors are vulnerable, terrorists will attempt to target them
in some fashion.
Other Considerations . There is more to defeating nuclear terrorism
than just the doctor and the locksmith. Robert Kupperman suggests that
there is no compelling reason to narrow our counterterrorism options.
He asserts that the best declaratory policy is no specific policy at all, but
rather an expanded menu of counterterrorism tools. (17)
Regrettably, there is also a role for the exterminator. The spectre of
nuclear violence should drive us to using such a tool - if we can develop
the political will to use the military capability we already possess. The
exterminator should be available both before and after every indication
that terrorists intend to go nuclear. Whether he takes the form of a
lightning raid or a single individual, well-placed within a terrorist
organization, the elimination of nuclear-minded terrorists must be part of
the menu; and all terrorists must know it.
Amiram Nir has suggested that any effective counterterrorist
strategy must be comprised of defensive measures, offensive actions, and
intelligence efforts. (18) Israel has demonstrated consistently that good
intelligence is the keystone to all other counter-terrorist actions. The
Israelis have also shown us that attacking terrorists (or state sponsors) is
very effective, at least in the short term. Whether or not the US
military's role is ever expanded to include pre-emptive strikes, the need
to improve American intelligence capabilities in Low Intensity Conflict is
acute.
During the late 1970s, the Carter administration made a deliberate
decision to reduce CIA reliance on human intelligence methods. The
clandestine arm of the agency was drawn down drasically while overhead
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surveillance systems were improved. The resulting strategy of almost
total reliance on "National Technical Means" did not anticipate the advent
of Low Intensity Conflict.
There is no way around human intelligence when it comes to finding
out about terrorist organizations. Governments must do whatever needs
to be done to infiltrate the organizations. In cases where plans for
nuclear violence are uncovered, the potentially extraordinary
ramifications serve to justify offensive military action, but without timely
and accurate intelligence, targeting terrorists where they live is
impossible. Without human intelligence sources and methods, no
intelligence will be produced. Therefore, part of the solution to
preventing and deterring nuclear terrorism is the re-orientation of US
intelligence agencies away from general war and towards Low Intensity
Conflict.
Managing Nuclear Terrorism . The final consideration regarding
nuclear terrorism is that of managing a nuclear terrorism event. Of one
thing we are almost certain - that event will not commence not with a
blast but with a drama. The US Government spends almost all of its
counterterrorism resources trying to prevent terrorist attacks with little
thought to minimizing the consequences of a successful attack. (19) The
same thinking prevails at the level of strategic nuclear war - civil defense
takes a back seat. The major reason for this could be that elected officials
do not want to create the impression that government cannot prevent the
worst disasters. But the protection of the homeland and its people is the
first responsibility of government, and systems to manage nuclear
terrorism must be in place at all levels.
This is not the case. Local and state "Emergency Operating Centers
(EOCs)" are, as usual, the most effective management organizations.
They are staffed and trained mainly to manage natural disasters, and the
frequency of these occurrences guarantees their basic efficacy. At the
federal level there is the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), whose charter it is to link together all state programs into a
national level management system. For a nuclear terrorism event FEMA
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does not have the resources or the authority to coordinate the numerous
government organizations and their efforts effectively. The biggest
reason for this is that FEMA must rely on other organizations to collect
and disseminate vital information. (20) Robert Kupperman explains what
would happen in response to a threat from terrorists to shoot down
American airliners at Stapleton Field in Denver unless certain terrorist
prisoners are released:
"Immediately following the release of this
hypothetical demand, a myriad of government
bureaucracies would leap into action, albeit
not necessarily in the same direction. The FBI,
state, and local law enforcement officials
would be charged with determining whether
the threat is real, as well as with apprehending
the perpetrators. The US and State Attorney
Generals' offices would be involved in any decision
to release (or not to release) prisoners. The US
State Department would have primary
responsibility for dealing with foreign terrorists
in a manner that is consistent with US antiterrorism
policy, while Defense Department and CIA officials
would be involved in threat assessment and potential
military responses. The Airline and Pilots Association
and FAA would have concerns about the air safety
considerations of not acceding to the terrorist demands.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency and state
emergency apparatus would be charge with civil
preparedness measures. Local and state politicians
in Denver would be concerned with the local public
relations crisis and with defusing the public panic.
The White House and Congress would have a vested
interest (although from different perspectives) in
demonstrating decisive leadership during the crisis. "(21)
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For a nuclear terrorism incident, one must add to this list of participants
the Department of Energy's Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST).
The sense of panic all over the country would render effective
government response next to impossible.
Exercises conducted by DOE and DOD have consistently surfaced
the major problem with managing such an incident - lack of central
authority. The biggest part of the problem is that military response
forces (the Counterterrorist Joint Task Force) does not work for the
"Defense Senior Representative" on the scene. There is no mechanism at
the Washington level (either at DOE or DOD) to straighten this out. (22)
Command and control problems plague all LIC events (Desert I and
Grenada are the best examples) but the failure to manage a developing
nuclear terrorism incident could have consequences far more severe than
anything short of all-out nuclear war.
Kupperman and others have suggested the formation of a dedicated
crisis management staff in the Executive Office of the President as the
key to solving these problems. Such a staff, manned by a small number
of professionals representing all departments of government, would be
able to manage major crises for the President. As a command node
superior to all government participants, it would be able to coordinate
and deconflict the efforts of all concerned. Additionally, it would take
the pressure off the NSC staff to fill such a role. It would, in fact, be
collocated with the NSC staff in order to facilitate close coordination with
all cabinet members. Being dedicated to the task, the President's crisis
management staff would be able to "game" all terrorism (and other LIC)
scenarios throughout the year. The lessons learned from these exercises
could then be turned into effective plans and policies.
Combatting terrorism, like all other Low Intensity Conflict
activities, is a process punctuated by events. It is, first and foremost, a
management process. Resolution of the events within is never easy and
never the same. Terrorism, as a species, cannot be made extinct. It can
be managed, however, to the point where all citizens are protected
beyond all reasonable expectations. Nuclear terrorism must be deterred,
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but failing that, it must be managed in such a way that mass killing is
avoided. Only the orchestrated and deliberate application of all the tools





In summary, the following recommendations are offered for
consideration:
1- Require Permissive Action Links (PALs) and command
disable features on all US nuclear weapons; then share the technology
with nations that have developed nuclear explosive devices.
2 - Plan and coordinate with the major news organizations,
public service information programs declaring that nuclear weapons are
not subject to detonation by terrorists, and that nuclear power plants are
not vulnerable to sabotage-induced release of radioactivity.
3 - Use US Counterterrorist Joint Task Force (CTJTF) units to
periodically test the security of nuclear weapons facilities, nuclear
transportation systems, and nuclear power plants.
4 - Tag all US nuclear weapons electronically to facilitate
Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) location efforts.
5 - Provide additional research & development funding for
NEST (there is no organization in the United States that deserves greater
access to state-of-the-art equipment).
6 - Create a crisis management staff within the Executive
Office of the President to direct all US Government counterterrorism
efforts. The commanders of both the Army and Navy components of the
CTJTF should be assigned to this staff immediately upon being relieved
of their commands.
7 - Completely abandon the use of man-portable nuclear
weapons (this process has begun for some types of units).
8 - Accelerate the removal of nuclear weapons from overseas
bases. As soon as possible, all US nuclear weapons not physically located
in the Continental United States should be carried on US Navy warships
or in USAF planes.
9 - Conduct frequent Command Post Exercises (CPXs) to test
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